Concepts of Emergence in Chemistry by Manafu, Alexandru
 
 
 
 
 
The Philosophy of Chemistry: Practices, Methodologies, and Concepts,  
Edited by Jean-Pierre Llored 
 
This book first published 2013  
 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing 
 
12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK 
 
 
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library 
 
 
Copyright © 2013 by Jean-Pierre Llored and contributors 
 
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, 
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. 
 
ISBN (10): 1-4438-4605-8, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4605-9 
 
CONCEPTS OF EMERGENCE IN CHEMISTRY 
ALEXANDRU MANAFU 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Nowadays many philosophers of science would claim that reductionism 
as a philosophical programme has failed. The philosophical accounts of 
inter-theoretic reduction encountered theoretical and practical difficulties. 
It has been argued that examples of successful intertheoretic reductions in 
science are few and far between. As regards chemistry, many have 
expressed doubts that a reduction of this discipline to physics can be had. 
On the other hand, nowadays almost everyone is a metaphysical 
naturalist. Chemists and philosophers alike contend that our world does 
not contain vitalistic chemical essences, spooky chemical souls, or 
chemical entelechies. They agree that if all the elementary entities that 
microphysics talks about (e.g., quarks, leptons, gauge bosons, fields, 
whatever) were to vanish, there would be nothing left: the atoms, the 
molecules and everything that is composed of them would also vanish. 
However, if all atoms and molecules were to disappear, the objects that 
form the subject matter of microphysics will not necessarily vanish; they 
may persist (e.g., as plasma). This asymmetry is a straightforward 
consequence of the direction of the composition relation: the objects that 
form the subject matter of chemistry are composed of the objects that form 
the subject matter of microphysics, but not vice versa. As a result, the 
latter may exist even in the absence of the former.1 In this very narrow and 
precise sense then, the microphysical domain has ontological primacy over 
the chemical domain. This is sometimes referred to as “the generality of 
microphysics”–all events are, or are exclusively composed out of parts 
which are, microphysical events, and so fall under microphysical laws.2  
It is hard to miss the apparent tension between the two claims made in 
the preceding paragraphs. If chemical stuff is composed of nothing else 
                                                            
1 Indeed, there was a time in the history of the universe when the objects that form 
the subject matter of chemistry did not exist. 
2 See for example P. Pettit (1993, p. 217).  
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except microphysical stuff, why doesn’t chemistry reduce to microphysics? 
How could the chemical domain depend so strongly on the microphysical 
domain, yet not reduce to it? 
A number of philosophers have provided reasons to think that the said 
tension is only prima facie. On their view, the generality of microphysics 
and the irreducibility of chemistry can be reconciled if we regard 
chemistry as emergent. According to the emergentists, all objects are 
composed–at their most fundamental level–of microphysical objects; 
however, it would be a mistake to conclude from here that all properties 
are physical properties; similarly, it would be a mistake to think that if all 
events are governed by physical laws then all laws must be physical. If 
emergentism is correct, there are genuine chemical properties and laws 
that do not reduce to physical properties and laws, although they are 
dependant upon them. 
“Emergence” is a philosophical term of art, with a lot of appeal to 
philosophically inclined scientists, including chemists. However, the 
meaning of this term often remains underarticulated and vague. A 
prominent contemporary philosopher writes: 
 
The term ‘emergence’ seems to have a special appeal for many people; it 
has an uplifting, expansive ring to it, unlike ‘reduction’ which sounds 
constrictive and overbearing. We now see the term being freely bandied 
about, especially by some scientists and science writers, with little visible 
regard for whether its use is underpinned by a consistent, tolerably unified, 
and shared meaning (Kim 2006, p. 547). 
 
I don’t think that the use of the term “emergence” is or should be 
reserved exclusively to philosophers. Also, I am quite sceptical that a 
unified meaning can be achieved for this term, even amongst philosophers. 
But I think there is a lot to learn if one pays attention to how philosophers–
some of them with a chemistry background–have thought about emergence 
in chemistry. This paper reviews some of the most prominent concepts of 
emergence that have been offered so far in the philosophical literature 
about chemistry. 
1. What is Emergence? 
As Kim noticed, emergentist positions vary from one author to another 
and therefore emergentism is hard to pin down. However, there is a set of 
features that many emergentist positions share. Virtually all emergentist 
positions hold some form of the view that the world consists of a hierarchy 
of levels or ontological strata (the microphysical, the macrophysical, the 
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chemical, the biological, the psychological) and each level depends on the 
previous level, but it is irreducible to it. Properties at a certain level 
interact to produce properties at a higher level (emergents). The relation 
between the lower level and the higher level is usually thought to be 
supervenience: higher-level properties are said to supervene on the lower 
level properties.3 These higher-level properties (emergents) arise from 
those at the lower level, but they cannot be predicted on the basis thereof. 
Emergents are often deemed to have novel causal powers, i.e., they have 
the capability to produce effects in a way that cannot be anticipated. 
Sometimes, emergents are said to be capable of downward causation–the 
ability to influence the basal conditions from which they arise (i.e., the 
underlying dynamics). Also, sometimes it is held that emergents involve 
global rather than merely local properties, and thus they arise only when 
the basal conditions are characterized by a certain amount of complexity. 
To sum up, emergents are usually characterized as novel, irreducible, 
unpredictable/unexplainable on the basis of the lower level theory, and on 
some views, capable of downward causation. 
Typically, emergence is correlated with the failure of reduction. 
Depending on how one construes irreducibility, one ends up with different 
types of emergence. On the classical account of reduction due to Nagel 
(1961), one theory is irreducible to another if the laws of the higher-level 
theory cannot be deduced from those of a more fundamental theory by 
employing bridge laws connecting the two levels. For example, if there 
were chemical truths that cannot be predicted (deduced) from quantum 
mechanics together with the requisite bridge laws, one would say that 
chemistry is irreducible to quantum mechanics. However, the notion of 
predictability is ambiguous; it may refer to predictability in principle or to 
predictability in practice. If we hold a strong notion of predictability (i.e. 
predictability in principle) then we end up with strong emergence: 
chemistry cannot be reduced to quantum mechanics even in principle. If 
we hold a weaker notion of predictability (i.e., predictability in practice) 
then some weaker version of emergence obtains; in this case, we would 
say that chemistry is weakly emergent–chemistry cannot be in practice 
reduced to physics. 
In chemistry, the following have been considered emergent or 
irreducible: chemical compounds, molecules, secondary properties of 
                                                            
3 A set of properties H supervenes on a set of properties L if and only if (i) any two 
objects x and y that have the same L properties will necessarily have the same H 
properties (though not necessarily vice versa), and (ii) any two objects z and w that 
differ in their H properties will also differ in their L properties (though not 
necessarily vice versa). 
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compounds such as their taste and colour, temperature, phases of matter, 
phase transitions, the shape of the molecules, atomic structure and 
properties, periodicity, aromaticity, chemical bond, chemical structure.  
2. Early Accounts of Emergence in Chemistry 
One of the earliest authors whose views about chemistry could be 
labelled as “emergent” is J.S. Mill (1806-1873). In A System of Logic, Mill 
talks about a chemical mode of causation, which he contrasts with a 
mechanical mode. In the mechanical mode of causation, the effect 
produced by two causes acting together is the sum of the effects of each 
cause acting independently. Mill calls this the principle of composition of 
causes, which in his view is akin to the principle of composition of forces 
in classical dynamics. On this mode of causation, the effect of the two 
causes acting in conjunction can be predicted deductively, from the effects 
of separate causes acting separately. The chemical mode of causation, on 
the other hand, does not obey the principle of composition of causes.  
The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a 
third substance, with properties different from those of either of the two 
substances separately, or of both of them taken together. Not a trace of the 
properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is observable in those of their 
compound, water. (Mill 1882, p. 267) 
In Mill’s view, chemical compounds have properties that are not “the 
sum” of the properties of their components taken separately or simply 
juxtaposed, as in a mixture. Besides the example of water, Mill gives the 
following examples: the sweet taste of sugar of lead (lead diacetate, 
Pb(C2H3O2)2) is not the sum of the tastes of its component elements, acetic 
acid and lead or its oxide; the color of blue vitriol (copper sulfate, CuSO4) 
is not a mixture of the colors of sulfuric acid (transparent) and copper(II) 
oxide (black), from which it is produced. Those effects whose properties 
do not resemble the properties of their causes are called by Mill 
heteropathic; the laws governing the production of these effects are called 
heteropathic laws. For Mill, the laws of chemistry are heteropathic, since 
they govern the production of substances whose properties do not 
resemble those of the reagents. 
It is unclear whether Mill’s conception of heteropathic laws is really at 
odds with reductionism. Admittedly, the properties of chemical compounds 
are not “the sum” of the properties of their components. But why should 
we expect them to be? A deductive explanation of the properties of 
chemical compounds in terms of the properties of their atomic constituents 
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could still be possible even if the manifest properties of these compounds 
are not “the sum” of the manifest properties of their components. Of 
course, for Mill such an explanation was out of sight. But as long as such 
an explanation remains possible in principle, Mill’s brand of emergentism 
would be classified as weak at best. 
Charles Dunbar Broad (1925) also noted the distinction between purely 
mechanical behaviour and chemical behaviour. According to Broad, 
chemistry “seems to offer the most plausible example of emergent 
behaviour” (Broad 1925, p.65). For Broad, a system is emergent if its 
properties cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the properties of its 
constituents taken separately or in other wholes, and of their proportions 
and arrangements in this whole. According to Broad, the emergent 
properties of chemical compounds cannot be predicted from exhaustive 
knowledge of the properties of the parts–the only way to learn about them 
is to study samples of those compounds. 
If the emergent theory of chemical compounds be true, a mathematical 
archangel, gifted with the further power of perceiving the microscopic 
structure of atoms as easily as we can perceive hay-stacks, could no more 
predict the behaviour of silver or of chlorine or the properties of silver 
chloride without having observed samples of those substances than we can 
at present. (Broad 1925, p. 71) 
The same holds true about chemical affinity. According to Broad, we 
cannot predict that two elements would combine chemically with each 
other until we perform the reaction. One of Broad’s examples is that of 
hydrogen and oxygen: 
 
Oxygen has certain properties and Hydrogen has certain other properties. 
They combine to form water, and the proportions in which they do this are 
fixed. Nothing that we know about Oxygen by itself or in its combinations 
with anything but Hydrogen would give us the least reason to suppose that 
it would combine with Hydrogen at all. Nothing that we know about 
Hydrogen by itself or in its combinations with anything but Oxygen would 
give us the least reason to expect that it would combine with Oxygen at all. 
And most of the chemical and physical properties of water have no known 
connexion, either quantitative or qualitative, with those of Oxygen and 
Hydrogen. (Broad 1925, p. 63) 
 
It would seem that Broad’s view of chemistry fits squarely in what we 
called strong emergence: the properties of a chemical compound 
(including its ability to react with other chemicals) cannot be in principle 
predicted from the properties of the elements taken separately. According 
to Broad, this impossibility stems from the fact that the laws of chemistry 
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are “unique and ultimate” (Broad 1925, p. 65). By this, Broad means that 
they are not special cases which arises through substituting certain 
determinate values for variables in a general law which connects the 
properties of any chemical compound with those of its separate elements 
and with its structure. This, in turn, is due either to (i) the existence of 
innumerable “latent” properties in each element, each of which is 
manifested only in certain conditions, or (ii) to the lack of any general 
principle of composition, such as the parallelogram law in dynamics, by 
which the behaviour of any chemical compound could be deduced from its 
structure and from the behaviour of each of its elements in isolation 
(Broad 1925, p. 66-67). 
Let’s consider the first possibility. According to a plausible interpretation 
of Broad, an emergent whole possesses force-generating properties of a 
sort not possessed by any of its parts (McLaughlin 2008, p. 41). When 
particles arrange themselves in certain configurations, new forces arise; 
these have been called configurational forces.4 In chemistry, configurational 
forces are higher-level chemical forces characterizing the compounds, 
irreducible to lower-level physical forces characterizing the components. 
They are responsible for the existence of emergent behaviour (chemical 
affinity, the properties of the compounds). Configurational forces are 
contrasted with resultant forces, i.e., non-emergent forces that are the 
generated by other forces, not by configurations of particles; “emergence”, 
therefore, is contrasted with “resultance”. 
If the second possibility obtains, one cannot learn about the properties 
of a compound by substituting certain values of the variables in a general 
law which connects the properties of that compound with those of its 
constituents, for there is no such general law. This would explain why the 
trans-ordinal laws that connect the properties of the atoms with those of 
compounds are unique and ultimate. They are ultimate because in 
determining the properties of a chemical compound there is no theoretical 
shortcut, one must study a sample. They are unique because by studying 
the rule Nature follows when it produces a certain compound one cannot 
learn anything about the rule Nature follows when it produces other 
compounds. 
Is Broad’s emergentism weak or strong? Given Broad’s “mathematical 
archangel” metaphor, one would think that Broad’s emergentism is of the 
strong kind. But caution is required if we try to establish whether or not on 
                                                            
4 Although Broad does not use this term, McLaughlin (2008) interprets Broad in 
this way. According to McLaughlin, “it is clear that he [i.e, Broad] maintains that 
certain structures of chemical compounds can influence motion in fundamental 
ways” (McLaughlin, 2008, p. 47). 
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Broad’s view chemistry is strongly emergent. Broad was aware of the 
possibility that the laws of chemical combination and the properties of 
compounds could turn out to be mere consequences of the laws of 
microphysics (Broad 1925, p. 73). Indeed, it has been argued that the 
advancements in the understanding of the atomic and molecular structure 
that took place during the 20th century make Broad’s claims regarding 
emergence in chemistry implausible (McLaughlin 2008). If these arguments 
are sound, Broad’s emergentism may be strong, but chemistry is not an 
example of strong emergence. 
3. Contemporary Accounts 
A recent approach to emergence in chemistry is due to Hendry (2006). 
Hendry’s account is based on the classical notion of emergence advocated 
by Broad. Hendry does not accept McLaughlin’s conclusion that there is 
no scintilla of evidence that there are configurational forces or downward 
causation in chemistry; he adopts McLaughlin’s distinction between 
resultant and configurational but he formulates it in terms of Hamiltonians, 
rather than forces. Using the quantum chemistry of the molecule, Hendry 
aims to show that there is downward causation in chemistry by showing 
that there are “configurational Hamiltonians” governing the behaviour of 
molecules. 
Hendry asserts that if the behaviour of some systems is governed by 
configurational (non-resultant) Hamiltonians, then the behaviour of those 
composite systems is not determined by the more general laws governing 
their constituents. He argues that to the extent that the behaviour of any 
subsystem is affected by the supersystems in which it participates, the 
emergent behaviour of complex systems must be viewed as determining, 
but not being fully determined by, the behaviour of their constituent parts. 
This, Hendry contends, is the case in the physical chemistry of the 
molecule, where the motions of the atoms are determined by the overall 
structure of the molecule. 
Hendry uses the concrete example of a CO2 molecule. The parts of this 
molecule can be seen as quantum mechanical harmonic oscillators and 
rigid rotators. However, this is possible only after we assume a certain 
structure for the whole molecule. Hendry points out that we use quantum 
mechanics to explain the motions of parts of the molecule within the 
context of a given structure for the molecule as a whole (in this case, a 
linear structure). The problem is that rather than deriving this structure 
using resultant Hamiltonians, we put it “by hand”–we assume 
“configurational Hamiltonians”. The fact that the motion of the parts of 
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molecule is determined by the overall structure is, according to Hendry, an 
example of downward causation. 
Is the chemical emergence that Hendry’s arguments support of a strong 
kind? If the molecular Hamiltonians are truly configurational and thus 
fundamental (i.e., not resultant), then the kind of emergence that Hendry’s 
arguments support is strong. If, however, they are resultant, then Hendry’s 
arguments support only weak emergence. The advocate of weak 
emergence may agree that the molecule as a whole constrains (determines) 
the motion of its parts. But she may argue that its ability to do so comes 
from the intrinsic and relational properties of the parts themselves (from 
the Coulomb attractive and repulsive forces between the parts and various 
other factors such as the Pauli principle, relativistic effects and even 
gravity). On this view, the use of configurational Hamiltonians is justified 
for pragmatic reasons (resultant Hamiltonians are just too hard to 
compute) or epistemic reasons (having to do with their explanatory role), 
but from an ontological perspective these Hamiltonians are ultimately 
resultant, albeit often unobtainable in practice. Nonetheless, Hendry’s own 
view seems to be that the molecular Hamiltonians are not resultant, so he 
seems to regard chemistry as strongly emergent. 
Hendry claims that his revision of traditional emergentism is at odds 
with the causal completeness (or causal closure) of physics–the thesis that 
“all physical events are determined (or have their chances determined) 
entirely by prior physical events according to physical laws” (Papineau 
1990, p. 67). If chemistry truly denies the causal completeness of physics 
then it would seem that this constitutes evidence for a strong notion of 
emergence; presumably, the existence of non-physical but causally 
efficient properties (such as sui generis chemical properties) guarantees 
that what’s true about them cannot be derived from the truths of 
microphysics. If one thinks that the causal closure of physics is grounded 
in the conservation of energy, it is not entirely clear how a strong version 
of emergence that denies it may respect this venerable principle of science. 
Another recent approach to emergence in chemistry is due to Paul 
Humphreys (1996; 1997a; 1997b). Humphreys’ account is original 
because it denies that the relationship between higher-level emergent 
properties and lower level properties is supervenience (1997a). Instead, it 
links emergence with the existence of a fusion operation that operates on i-
level properties and outputs i+1-level properties, which have novel causal 
powers. 
Humphreys’ fusion process is formally represented as follows. Let 
1)( txP
i
r
i
m represent an i-level entity, rx , instantiating an i-level property, mP , 
at time 1t . 1)( txP
i
s
i
n will denote another i-level entity, sx , instantiating 
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another i-level property, nP , at time 1t . Humphreys introduces the fusion 
operation symbolized by [.*.], which takes as arguments the two property 
instances 1)( txP
i
r
i
m  and 1)( txP
i
s
i
n  and fuses them: [ ]11 )(*)( txPtxP isinirim . The 
fusion operation is an i-level operation, i.e., an operation of the same level 
as its arguments. The result of the fusion operation is the fused 
property [ ] 2)*(* txxPP isirinim  at the i+1-level, which can also be written as [ ][ ]( )21111 ** txxPP isirilil ++++ . This property is what is emergent on 
Humphreys’ account. The fused property is a unified whole in the sense 
that its causal effects cannot be represented in terms of the separate causal 
effects of the original property instances. 
According to Humphreys, the non-separable states of quantum 
mechanics are examples of fusion emergence. A composite non-separable 
quantum system is holistic, in that the joint system possesses a state while 
the components taken individually do not. Given that quantum 
entanglement has a role in chemical bonding (via the Pauli Exclusion 
Principle), one would be tempted to claim that molecules are an example 
of fusion emergence.5 
Humphreys’ account of emergence was motivated by the desire to 
avoid the threats of the exclusion argument for reductionism, which states 
that higher-level emergent properties are excluded from affecting lower-
level properties, since all the causal work is done by the latter (see Kim 
1992; 1999; 2006). Humphreys argues that at the time when the fused 
property instance [ ]11 )(*)( txPtxP isinirim  comes into existence, the original 
property instances 1)( txP
i
r
i
m  and 1)( txP
i
s
i
n  cease to exist. Therefore, it is a 
fortiori the case that they cannot compete as causes with the emergent 
property instance. On Humphreys account, emergents don’t coexist with 
their bases, and this feature prevents the exclusion argument to get off the 
ground. 
Humphreys explicitly suggests that his version of emergence challenges 
the assumption that the physical domain is causally closed (Humphreys 
1997b, p. 3). The causal closure thesis asserts that the ultimate causes of 
all physical effects are themselves physical and is often taken to be 
                                                            
5 See Humphrey’s conference talk titled “A defence of ontological emergence” 
which was presented at the International School on Complexity 9: Emergence in 
the Physical and Biological Worlds, Ettore Majorana Foundation, Sicily, in 2008. 
Since Humphreys has not turned this conference paper into a publication (yet), it is 
uncertain whether he is still committed to the view that molecules exemplify fusion 
emergence. 
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synonymous with the completeness thesis. Just as Hendry’s emergentism, 
Humphreys’ fusion emergence seems to be of a strong kind. Given that on 
Humphrey’s account (some of) the properties of the parts are used up in 
the process of the formation of the whole, it would seem that a 
(synchronous) derivation of the properties of the whole from the properties 
of the parts is precluded in principle; this would further support the idea 
that fusion emergence is strong (synchronous) emergence.6 
A number of contemporary authors have recently proposed concepts of 
emergence that are applicable to phenomena studied by science in general. 
Although the examples that these authors refer to come from specific 
domains (the theory of cellular automata, physics, etc) these concepts of 
emergence are applicable to a host of phenomena, including those in the 
purview of chemistry. 
Mark Bedau (2008) thinks that there is not much room for strong 
emergence in contemporary science, and even if such strongly emergent 
phenomena existed, they could at best play a primitive role and thus they 
will be scientifically irrelevant. Bedau defends a version of emergence that 
he even refers to as “weak emergence”. Weak emergence is compatible 
with the generality of microphysics: 
 
Macro entities and their states are wholly constituted by the states and 
locations of their constituent micro entities, so the causal dynamics 
involving macro objects is wholly determined by the underlying micro 
dynamics. (Bedau 2008, p. 161). 
 
But Bedau also recognizes that the global properties of a macro system 
may influence the behaviour at the micro-level. This is a sort of downward 
causation; however, the kind of downward causation is not the same as the 
fundamental kind of downward causation that is associated with strong 
emergence. The properties of the macro system (including the causal 
properties) are a consequence of the properties of the micro systems that 
compose it, but the derivation is usually hard to obtain. The hallmark of 
Bedau’s weak emergence is that to obtain such a derivation there is no 
theoretical shortcut: one must resort to simulation. Bedau claims that 
causal processes in nature are caused by the iteration and aggregation of 
                                                            
6 This leaves open the possibility that what counts as strong emergence from the 
synchronous perspective would qualify as weak emergence if a diachronic notion 
of derivability is favoured. Besides these temporal aspects, the issue of whether 
Humphreys’ fusion emergence is strong or weak is further complicated by various 
factors such as the nature of the fusion process and the potential differences 
between completeness and causal closure. This is not the place to address all these 
complications. 
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micro causal interactions. The only way to predict the macro properties of 
weakly emergent systems is to follow the same steps of iteration and 
aggregation that Nature follows, with the help of powerful computers. 
Bedau’s examples of weak emergence come primarily from the theory 
of cellular automata. For example, being a glider gun is a weakly emergent 
property in the Game of Life–a glider gun is a macro-level property, which 
is realized by a variety of micro-level configurations of cells. Thus, 
Bedau’s emergence is compatible with a weak notion of reductionism–
token reductionism, which claims that all property instances are lower 
level property instances; but insofar it is committed to the idea that the 
same macro property can be instantiated by a variety of different micro 
properties (see the multiple realizability of the glider gun example), 
Bedau’s emergence is incompatible with type reductionism–the idea that 
all properties are lower level properties. According to Bedau, explanations 
that contain emergents (macro explanations) are autonomous in relation to 
micro explanations–they are overarching explanations that unify an 
otherwise heterogeneous collection of micro instances. 
Concepts of emergence that emphasize context sensitivity, nonlinearity, 
feedback loops, and the importance of organization between the parts of 
compositionally complex systems have been presented by William 
Wimsatt (2000; 2008) and Sandra Mitchell (2010). These accounts of 
emergence are not intended to apply to chemistry in particular and they 
seem to be compatible even with a strong notion of reduction (type 
reductionism). This is why those inclined to see reductionism (or at least a 
strong variant thereof) and emergence as mutually exclusive would not 
readily embrace these accounts as emergentist. Indeed, what these 
accounts call “emergence” would actually count as “resultance” in the 
eyes of those who hold more conservative views about emergence.7 
An emergentist account intended to apply to specifically to chemistry 
has been offered by Luisi (2002). By the term emergence Luisi understands 
the onset of novel properties that arise when a certain level of structural 
complexity is formed from components of lower complexity. Luisi 
emphasizes that molecular sciences, and chemistry in particular, are 
actually the disciplines in which the notion of emergence has the most 
obvious applicability. Luisi offers the following examples of emergent 
properties in chemistry: the aromaticity of a benzene molecule, which is 
not present in the atoms that form the molecule; the properties of water 
and of all other molecules, which are not present in the atomic components; 
                                                            
7 For a discussion of the distinction between emergence and resultance in the 
context of British emergentism, see McLaughlin (2008). 
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and the oxygen-binding properties of complex chemical structures like 
hemoglobin or myoglobin which are not present in the single aminoacids. 
Luisi considers the following two questions. Can the properties of 
molecules be explained a posteriori from the properties of the 
components? Can they be foreseen a priori? Luisi argues that there are no 
reasons to think that the liquid properties of water, the aromaticity of 
benzene, or the folding of myoglobin, cannot be in principle explained or 
even foreseen on the basis of the properties of the components. Thus, Luisi 
seems to be entirely committed to token reductionism. He even goes as far 
as claiming that the hypothesis that the emergent properties of molecules 
cannot be explained as a matter of principle on the basis of the 
components is tantamount to assuming a force of some non-defined nature 
(Luisi 2002, p. 193).8 But he points out that in practice, emergent 
properties are almost impossible to predict. This is especially true for large 
molecules like myoglobin, in the case of which the 20 different amino 
acids and a chain length of 153 amino acid residues, gives rise to 20153 
possible theoretical chains, myoglobin being one of those. 
According to Luisi, chemistry offers examples of downward causation, 
understood as the influence of the relatedness of the parts on the behaviour 
of the parts themselves. One example that Luisi offers is that of benzene: 
when a benzene molecule is created, the orbitals of carbon atoms and 
those of hydrogen are changed; the molecule as a whole affects the 
properties of its constituents. Of course, it is true that the molecule of 
benzene could not have emerged if its components did not have the right 
properties (Luisi does not deny upward causation), but it is also true that 
once the molecule is formed it constraints the motion of its parts. For 
Luisi, downward causation is the consequence of upward causation, and 
once the two exist, they take place simultaneously in a sort of “cyclic” 
causality. But the kind of downward causation that Luisi endorses differs 
significantly from the kind of downward causation that the British 
emergentists talked about; it does not assume any special forces at work 
other than the normal laws of physics. 
Luisi’s account of emergence resembles very much Bedau’s weak 
emergence, especially when one compares the two authors’ views about 
predictability and downward causation. 
Another concept of emergence has been offered by Robert Batterman 
(2002; 2010). Although Batterman’s examples of emergence are primarily 
                                                            
8 It is plausible to think of this force of a non-defined nature that Luisi talks about 
as a “configurational force” in McLaughlin’s terms. 
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from physics, his view of emergence has the potential of applying to 
chemistry as well, and for this reason it is worth mentioning.9 
Batterman distinguishes between two senses of reduction. One may 
talk of the reduction of one theory to another in the philosopher’s sense 
(e.g., Nagelian reduction, where the laws of a coarse grained theory are 
derived from the laws of another, fine-grained, theory); or one may talk of 
reduction in the physicist’s sense (the fine grained theory reduces to the 
coarse grained theory in the limit of some parameter having a certain 
value). For example, relativistic mechanics reduces to classical mechanics 
in the limit in which 0)/( 2 →cv . Now, the limiting relations between 
theories may be regular (when the “limiting behaviour” as the parameter 
tends to a certain value resembles the “behaviour in the limit”, where the 
parameter has that value), or they may be singular (when the behaviour in 
the limit differs markedly from the limiting behaviour). Many pairs of 
theories are related by singular limiting behaviour: quantum and classical 
mechanics, the wave and ray optics, statistical mechanics and 
thermodynamics. 
For Batterman, the singular nature of the limiting relations between 
pairs of theories is indicative of emergence: the behaviour of the system as 
certain parameter approaches a certain value is different from the 
behaviour of the system when that value is reached. When the limiting 
relations are singular we can expect novel phenomena in the asymptotic 
regime between the two theories. Often, such in the case of 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, the coarser (higher level) 
theory can be derived (reduced in the philosopher’s sense) from the fine 
grained (lower level) theory only if one makes the assumption that when a 
certain parameter (viz. the number of particles, N) approaches infinity. But 
real systems are always finite, and a strict derivation obtains only in the 
thermodynamic limit. As a result, one may speak of the phenomena of 
thermodynamics as emerging from statistical mechanics. Qualitative 
changes in the states of matter known as phase transitions (e.g., freezing 
and boiling water, the transition from the ferromagnetic phase to the 
paramagnetic phase) are also considered emergent since it proves very 
difficult (if not impossible) to reduce them to the underlying microphysics 
if we do not appeal to infinite idealizations. 
                                                            
9 In fact, if one regards thermodynamics and statistical mechanics as disciplines 
that equally fall within the purview of chemistry (as many chemistry textbooks 
do), Batterman’s notion of emergence is applicable to at least this chemical 
example. 
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Batterman’s approach pays close attention to mathematical procedures 
such as renormalization–a mathematical technique for characterizing how 
the structure of interactions varies with the scale considered. 
Renormalization reveals how theories at different levels are related, but 
such relation is not reduction: it turns out that the phenomena studied by 
the higher-level theory are decoupled from those at the lower level. 
For Batterman, emergence is also associated with universality or 
multiple realizability (systems very different at the micro-level exhibiting 
identical macro-level behaviour). Multiple realizability shows that lower-
level explanations cannot adequately account for the convergence of the 
behaviour of varied systems, and higher-level level explanations that 
ignore the micro-level details are required. In contrast with the classical 
notions of emergence, Batterman’s notion of emergence does not 
subscribe to the downward causation thesis or to the idea that mereological 
part/whole relations play a crucial role in emergence. 
There is another concept of emergence that applies to chemistry, but so 
far both chemists and philosophers of chemistry have not acknowledged 
it–I’ll label it “functional emergence”. Functional emergence refers to the 
idea that many chemical properties are defined not by a shared 
microphysical ingredient, but functionally, by a common behaviour. Take, 
for example, the property of being an acid.10 The property of being an acid 
is defined functionally, by pointing to a common behaviour of these 
substances in chemical reactions (the ability to donate a proton, on the 
Brønsted-Lowry theory) rather than to a shared microphysical ingredient 
(a hydrogen atom, for example). 
Functional emergence is committed to the generality of microphysics: 
e.g, every acidic molecule is a complex microphysical system of 
interacting electrons, protons and neutrons, all obeying the laws of physics 
(token reductionism is respected). However, functional emergence agrees 
that it would be mistake to conclude from here that chemical properties are 
microphysical properties in disguise.11 Similarly, it rejects the idea that if 
all events are governed by physical laws, then all laws must be physical. 
According to functional emergence, there are genuine chemical properties 
and laws, which are type-irreducible to the properties and laws of 
microphysics. The reason for this is multiple realizability: one and the 
same chemical property (e.g., acidity) is realized by a variety of 
                                                            
10 Many other examples of chemical functional properties can be given: being a 
base, an oxidant, a reductant, a metal, or being a piezoelectric. 
11 A chemical property is a physical property in disguise if the chemical property is 
identical with a very complex physical property but this identity relation is not 
obvious. 
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microphysical lower level properties (systems of electrons, protons and 
neutrons), and thus it cannot be identified with any particular microphysical 
constitutive property. As a result, the laws in which functional chemical 
properties occur will not be derivable from the laws of microphysics 
simply because the latter lack the requisite terms. Since derivability seems 
to be impossible in principle, functional emergence seems to qualify 
partially as strong emergence. I say partially because only the chemical 
laws that contain terms denoting functional properties cannot be derived, 
but particular chemical events may still be predictable from the underlying 
physics. However, unlike other varieties of strong emergence, functional 
emergence does not go as far as to deny the causal closure of physics. 
Conclusion 
Developing accounts of emergence in chemistry is important because 
emergence typically offers a way of reconciling the failure of reduction 
with the commitment to the generality of microphysics. In addition, 
emergence seems a promising way to secure the ontological autonomy of 
chemistry. If a theory of chemical emergence can demonstrate that 
chemical properties are not just complicated microphysical properties in 
disguise, then chemistry is autonomous from microphysics not only from a 
historical, epistemic or pragmatic point of view, which is never contested, 
but also from an ontological one, which is more problematic. 
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